kscarbel

The E7 E-Tech is not a Renault design although the French truckmaker controlled Mack during its development. The E7 E-Tech is an E7 with unit pump injection. Renault's name was on the block because the E7 E-Tech also equipped Renault Magnum heavy trucks sold in Europe and the global market.

I'm very sorry, We seem to have our wires crossed again. The first paragraph of my original post was specifically about "Class 8" truck sales. Which is why I wanted to point out to you that it was not speaking of “1999 truck sales as a whole”, rather just Class 8. One must break down each market segment separately (class 5, class 7, ect.) in order to speak definitively. "This February saw strong sales. Per commercial vehicle industry data publisher ACT Research, new orders for Class 8 trucks in February increased 30% from the same month last year" Also, my post did not state that 2014 Class 8 sales (YTD) were up 30%, as you said. Rather it stated that January 2014 sales soared 50%, and February sales jumped 30%, over the same period a year ago. For January 2014, Class 8 trucks sales were 14,119, a 50% rise over last year. For February 2014 truck sales were 28,876, a 30% rise over last year.

I didn’t realize you’ve been in truck sales all these years. Then, you should know where I’m coming from. However, I’m not talking about “1999 truck sales as a whole”, rather I’m specifically talking abut Class 8. As you can see below, Class 8 made a drastic 60 percent uptick in 2011 that put us back in our traditional sales range. Year Units Sold Percent Growth 1999 263,136 2000 211,518 (19.6%) 2001 139,576 (34.0%) 2002 145,883 4.5% 2003 141,931 (2.7%) 2004 203,197 43.2% 2005 252,972 24.4% 2006 284,008 12.3% 2007 150,965 (46.8%) 2008 133,473 (11.6%) 2009 94,778 (29.0%) 2010 107,152 13.1% 2011 171,425 60.0% 2012 194,715 13.6% 2013 184,784 (5%) For January 2014, Class 8 trucks sales were 14,119, a 50% rise over last year. For February 2014 truck sales were 28,876, a 30% rise over last year. So considering the data, one can quite reasonably compare 1999 Class 8 trucks sales with today’s numbers.

Volvo has destroyed the Mack parts operations by raising parts pricing as much as five-fold, so as to improve their margins. I know of six Mack distributors right now that are actively promoting Chinese clutches rather than Spicer because Volvo's price is absurd. That situation never existed at Mack Trucks. We gave our distributors truck-load pricing with no minimum quantity direct from our five parts distribution centers, and sales took off. Our distributors were able to compete head on with the parts houses and steal their market share. We were able to take care of all our customer's parts needs, aside from tires, and save them money! Volvo has created a convoluted situation, literally pushing the distributors away from the Volvo/Mack parts system. Now, the majority of parts ordered by distributors from the Volvo parts distribution centers are proprietary parts for warranty repairs.

This February saw strong sales. Per commercial vehicle industry data publisher ACT Research, new orders for Class 8 trucks in February increased 30% from the same month last year. Riding February’s class 8 sales wave, Volvo-brand truck North American deliveries rose 69% to 2,412 trucks, and Mack-branded Volvo deliveries rose 43% to 1,477. From the data above, we can see that Volvo-brand North American truck sales were 64 percent higher than the Swedish truckmaker’s Mack-brand sales. If the Mack-brand was even able to sell 1,477 trucks every month in 2014, that would only equate to 17,724 units for the entire year. In comparison, during the last full year of Mack Trucks in 1999, the company sold 34,264 units, nearly double that figure. As many of you are seeing, the Volvo brand is clearly being promoted for highway applications, leaving the Mack brand to vocational (where the Mack brand is losing market share). No doubt Olof Persson is delighted with North America’s newfound willingness to shift to Volvo-branded trucks, reassuring him that Volvo will successfully be able to migrate most of its Mack-brand market share over to Volvo in the future, as they did with White and GMC, and bring a close to this transaction.

My friend, please don't twist my words. I have said that Volvo makes a descent engine, though certainly not in the same league as Scania. I never said or insinuated that Volvo's powerplants were "bottom of the barrel". I did say, and will say again, that Volvo should call a spade a spade and stop rebadging the Volvo D-Series engines as a Mack product. Volvo Powertrain does not produce pedigreed engines. I also said the MAN D20 and D26, from which the license-built MaxxForce 11 and 13 are based, are superb engines. Ask anyone in the global market. Navistar made major changes (deviations) to their license-built versions, employing Massive EGR (MEGR) with absurdly high EGR rates from 35% to 50%, in an attempt to meet EPA2010. Engine performance and durability, for reasons obvious to everyone but Dan Ustian, suffered. Now Navistar is falling back on SCR, the proven technology of today. Though Navistar is using a Cummins-designed SCR solution rather than MAN's SCR technology, I expect the MAN-based Navistar MaxxForce 11 and 13 in SCR form will perform near or equal to their German relatives.

Some customers operating E7 E-Tech engines encountered issues, but certainly not all. Some camshaft problems, due to an H-ring caused lifter misalignment condition*, were an unacceptable inconvenience to the customer. The E-Tech was popular with many customers. In fact, the E7-460XT made quite a name for itself. The E-Tech “EUP” (Electronic Unit Pump) version of the Mack E7 engine featured Bosch’s widely used “PLD” electronically-controlled high pressure (up to 1800 Bar) unit injector pumps. Fuel injection is controlled by a high speed solenoid valve controlled by the engine control module. A Bosch supply pump (ZP6) is gear-driven directly from the engine camshaft. To meet the EUP fuel flow demands, fuel flow (454 liters/hour) and pressures (6.2 - 7.5 Bar) are much higher than previous systems. The additional fuel flow helps to cool the EUP while the higher pressure ensures the gallery is full. The nozzle and holder assembly is similar to past engines, but has a more robust 22mm design to withstand the higher fuel pressures involved, and has a non-return valve at the inlet. The E7 E-Tech is an E7 with unit pump injection. The adoption of EUP wasn’t a Renault influence. From 1995, the whole industry was migrating to Bosch unit pump injection. Just as, from 2007 to reach Euro-5 (near EPA2007), the industry migrated to higher pressure common rail, and extra-high pressure common rail for Euro-6 (near EPA2010). My only regret is that common rail injection wasn’t yet available in the 1990s. The Euro-4 (near EPA2004) engines sold today in year 2014 (many countries today are Euro-4 or less) utilize Bosch common rail with SCR, a very straightforward, trouble-free and high-performing solution. FYI: While we say EUP, Bosch refers to it as UPS (Unit Pump System). Little Known Facts: The Mack E7 E-Tech, when installed in the Renault Magnum tractor, carried the Renault engine designation MIDR 06.24.65. http://renault-magnum.ru/manual/2-1.pdf http://renault-magnum.ru/manual/2-2.pdf * http://hr.mckenzietank.com/maint/Bulletins/45-SB213034.pdf http://hr.mckenzietank.com/maint/Bulletins/45-sb213006.pdf http://hr.mckenzietank.com/maint/Bulletins/45-sb213033.pdf http://www.bigmacktrucks.com/index.php?/topic/7734-e-7-lifter-h-ring/

While failed leadership can obviously lead to a company’s downfall, the case of Mack Trucks was different. From 1992, Volvo had made a decision to acquire its fourth U.S. truckmaker – Mack Trucks. Engaging in ruthless and disreputable activities, Volvo acquired the allegiance of several Mack and Renault executives. Then working from the inside out, Volvo was able to take the ball down to their end of the court. I find Mack’s board of directors guilty of not adequately vetting the integrity and principles of Marc Gustafson. After wasting 11 months in 1989 under the helm of Ralph Reins, Renault became Mack’s majority stakeholder in 1990. The French truckmaker sent a brilliant warm-hearted man across the Atlantic to lead Mack in the form of Elios Pascual. You would almost have thought Zenon Hansen had returned, as Elios fired back up the Mack spirit that Zenon had pioneered. Elios Pascual was no stranger to Mack. He had been Renault’s representative to Mack since 1978, and was part of the team that developed the Mid-Liner medium truck range from 1979. When Renault assumed control, Mack employees were at first very concerned, needless to say, about what would transpire under Renault. But the outgoing Elios Pascual immediately reached out to Mack employees, helping them realize that Renault was dedicated to making Mack strong again. Pascual quickly earned the trust and respect of Mack’s employees, and revived the Mack team spirit originally inspired by the legendary Zenon C.R. Hansen. Altogether, Renault invested over US$300 million in Mack Trucks. As acting Mack president from 1990 to 1995, Elios Pascual began a series of initiatives that resulted in impressive strides forward. From 1993 thru 1999, Mack Trucks increased its heavy truck market share in the United States for seven consecutive years. Mack sold 34,264 trucks in 1999, a 28 percent increase over 1998 The company's market share in 1999 reached 13.1 percent, up from 12.8 percent in 1998. 1999 U.S. market share Freightliner 31.9% Navistar International 15.9%. Mack 13.1% Kenworth 10.9% Volvo 10.7% Peterbilt 10.2% Ford/Sterling 5.5% Mack’s Canadian sales ticked down in 1999 to 2,858 units, as market share declined from 10 percent to 9.3 percent. However Mack Australia’s 1999 sales rose 6 percent to 746 trucks, with a 12.1 percent market up from 11.7 percent in 1998. Mack exports grew in 1999, with a 22.5 percent share in exported North American heavy trucks. With Mack truck sales solid and growing throughout the 1990s, Volvo remained obsessed with acquiring Mack Trucks and buying up yet another American truckmaker’s market share (Autocar, GMC, White).

Comparing the modern Volvo Engine Brake (rebadged as Mack “Powerleash”) to the Mack “Dynatard” engine brake is rather unfair. I-VEB (Volvo Engine Brake with Intelligence) was introduced in 2006, while Mack “Dynatard” was designed long ago. I have a close relationship with Jacobs. They are amazing people who engineer the world’s best engine brakes. It’s no wonder that Daimler hired Jacobs to design world-leading engine brake for the OM 471, OM472 and OM473 (DD13, DD15 and DD16) rather than design their own. An EPA2010 Mack E9 would certainly include the latest Jacobs engine braking technology.

No, no, thank you for sharing a good discussion. My friend, I respectfully suggest that it's inaccurate to say that Mack Trucks always had financial issues. To depict Mack Trucks as a company that was constantly in financial hardships couldn’t be further from the truth. The company was growing in leaps and bounds from its inception. Every car and truck maker is constantly financially challenged (the Big 3 in 2008-2010). It’s the nature of the business. Adding to that, the truck business is quite cyclical. Another key aspect to consider is from the late 1970s, we were entering the era of lean “just-in-time” production, an entirely new age of manufacturing that required changes in how we did business. Mack Trucks was proactively reshaping itself to adapt to meet the new challenge. While invisible to the customer and without any negative effect on product development, Mack Trucks from the end of 1979 thru the summer of 1986 took aggressive steps to reduce expenses. These actions included the opening of a high-tech US$80 million assembly plant in South Carolina for the ‘80s, ‘90s and 21st century, and the reduction of non-union employees from 6,000 to 3,500. Broadening its product range by re-entering the medium truck segment was another example of a Mack Trucks re-entrenching itself for the long run. For the purpose of discussion, using January 7, 1965 as a starting point when Zenon C.R. Hansen took over, Mack was on the move and making money. On this forum, there are those that misunderstand the Signal Companies* involvement with Mack Trucks. Zenon went into that agreement to fuel Mack’s growth, under the condition that Mack Trucks retained its autonomy. The goal and condition were both met. The UAW challenged Mack Trucks in the 1980s when Jack Curcio sought to replace the antiquated 61-year-old Plant 5C in Allentown and establish a new 537,000 square foot non-union plant in Winnsboro, South Carolina (a right-to-work state), reducing Mack’s exposure to the high-cost union environment. The new facility would take advantage of the latest production technologies, and be the first U.S. truck plant to employ the modular assembly concept (as was being used at Scania). The modern layout of the new Winnsboro plant required fewer employees. High efficiency production and material handling equipment including state-of-the-art robotics, integrated information systems and statistical process control allowed Mack to manage inventory and production scheduling more effectively and produce a higher quality truck at lower cost. (Winnsboro was managed by Don Lindgren, who had formerly overseen Plant 5C) In describing the challenges of America’s truck industry in December 1986, Jack Curcio said, "We operate in an environment of vigorous competition and industry-wide overcapacity. The combination of trucking deregulation, a globalization of the economy and a decline in the size and volume of freight being hauled has created a more efficiency-conscious customer, and suggests little prospect for growth in industry volume through the next few years." “Foreign producers have now entered the North American market - the last open frontier for their products. While many have formed alliances with domestic producers, the influx of other independents will heighten even further the competitive challenge faced by all participants." Mack was projecting that the U.S. domestic industry would sell no more than 115,000 units in 1986 (roughly the same volume as 1984 and 1985), with the possibility of perhaps, at best, "a modest increase or 1987." "Given our present deflationary environment, and the still emerging competition from offshore manufacturers, it is likely that the severe industry-wide price competition we've seen over the past two years will continue." "Mack's future success requires that we substantially reduce our production costs and bring our overall corporate cost structure into line with our expectations for operating levels. Current market conditions dictate that we become as lean as possible, and we will continue to do more with less." I have respect for United States Marine Corps veteran Jack Curcio (5th Marines, 1st Marine Division, Korea 1952-53). But how he went about moving towards his vision of a new status quo with the UAW came at great expense to the company. Zenon always had a good relationship with the union, one of his amazing abilities to find common ground with people. Perhaps a more tactful Jack Curcio would have had a greater chance of success, but I suspect the UAW’s international office* would have maintained their uncooperative stance. I believe the UAW failed to modernize their thought process and evolve with the changing times. Thus it bears considerable blame for Mack’s financial troubles by 1989 that forced Renault to step in. Macungie’s union workers voted in favor of accepting the wage concessions Curcio wanted so that production would remain in Allentown. Local 677's negotiating committee on Saturday January 18, 1987 endorsed a six-year contract calling for wage concessions but promising jobs at the new South Carolina plant to at least 600 of the company's laid-off Pennsylvania workers. But, the UAW refused to disclose results of the balloting. Local 677 president Kim Blake said, "This agreement was unanimously approved by the Local 677 bargaining committee." The dispute between Local 677 and the UAW's international office in Detroit became so intense that the UAW imposed a news blackout. In the end, the UAW ignored the voting results at Local 677 and told Curcio that wage concessions was out of the question. Only then did Curcio move forward with the South Carolina plant. However, within a week, the UAW's international office said it would withhold approval of the contract because of terms it viewed as unacceptable. After opening in August 1987, the UAW successfully unionized Winnsboro in April 1989. Mack did benefit from a modern new state-of-the-art plant, but the potential savings of a non-union facility vanished. Financially challenged by the summer of 1989 due to the UAW, Renault stepped in because the French truckmaker remained so impressed with Mack. Renault initially was no more than a minority stakeholder, a position was born out of Mack’s decision to sell a U.S. version of Renault’s popular medium truck range. As Mack President Al Pelletier said in March 1979 during his announcement that Renault purchase a stake in Mack, "In the long run, we will need a partner to compete with all the giants of the industry. We looked for a partner and we found one in Renault." Al Pelletier’s successor John Curcio said of Renault, "They came to the party in 1983 when nobody else loved us." However, as RVI Chairman Phillippe Gras stated, "A few years ago, we were satisfied with Mack because it earned money at a time when RVI was losing a huge amount. We would now like to see this investment produce a good return." I have no problem with worker representation. Like Zenon Hansen, I believe worker representation, done right and legitimately, has a place in business. However, here’s an example of why the UAW troubles me. http://www.autonews.com/article/20140312/OEM01/140319927/uaw-slams-decision-giving-anti-union-workers-voice-in-vw-dispute If the UAW of the 1980s had been willing to enter into a new era of cooperation and compromise with Mack, as the UAW of 2008-2010 had been forced to do during the Big 3’s financial crisis, Mack Trucks would be with us today. And, the replacement facility for Plant 5C would have been located in the Lehigh Valley rather than South Carolina. Jack Curcio realized the threat presented by the foreign truckmakers in the United States, and was trying to reshape the company in the face of changing times, enhancing efficiency and profitability to ensure Mack’s long-term survival. But the union didn’t heed his warnings of the dark clouds ahead, and chose to proceed with business as usual (when the Big 3 were on the verge of collapse, threatening the UAW’s existence, it amazingly became very cooperative). Note: Per Navistar spokesman John D. McDonald, Navistar was interested in buying Mack only if Renault was willing to sell its stake. * In 1964, Garrett allowed itself to become a subsidiary of The Signal Companies, the nation's largest west coast oil company, in order to avoid a hostile takeover by Curtiss-Wright Corporation. In 1967, in order to raise capital to support Mack's rapid growth, Mack Trucks agreed to become a subsidiary of The Signal Companies on the condition that that Mack was guaranteed complete autonomy (a requirement demanded by legendary Mack president and CEO Zenon C.R. Hansen). Thus, both Mack Trucks and Garrett AiResearch were subsidiaries of the Signal Companies. Signal purchased Mack Trucks in 1967, sold 40 percent to Renault in July 1983 and sold 50 percent in a public offering in August 1983. The remaining 10 percent (3.1 million shares) was sold in July 1986 by the Henley Group, a corporate spin-off resulting from the Signal-Allied merger. In 1985, Signal merged with Allied Corp. and became Allied-Signal. The company bought Honeywell in 1999 and adopted the Honeywell name.

Financial Times / March 18, 2014 Scania has rejected Volkswagen’s US$9.2 billion (6.7 billion Euro) bid, throwing into doubt the German automotive group’s offer and its plans to create a truckmaker with the clout to rival Daimler. The independent committee of the board of the Swedish truckmaker said VW’s bid– which represented a premium of about 50 per cent to Scania’s undisturbed share price – “does not reflect the long-term fundamental value of Scania”. VW was keen to bring Scania – where it already owns 89 per cent of the votes and 63 per cent of the capital – together with its other truck brand, MAN, in an attempt to squeeze out hundreds of millions of Euros in synergies, particularly in developing new trucks. But the Scania committee, made up of the five board members who are not linked to VW, said that the bid “[does not reflect] a fair share of the expected synergy potential and recommends to Scania’s shareholders not to tender their shares”. VW now has to choose whether to raise its bid in an attempt to receive a recommendation from Scania’s board, pull out, or go hostile and take its offer directly to the Swedish truckmaker’s minority shareholders. The German group had no immediate comment on Tuesday. Those shareholders have been split over the merits of the bid. Scania is seen as one of the crown jewels of Swedish industry and observers have noted that VW’s bid comes near the bottom of the truck cycle. Some shareholders have spoken out against the bid but others – including the Swedish Shareholders’ Association, which has long been critical of VW’s conduct at Scania – were inclined to accept it as a way of ending the current situation where the German group all but controls Scania but has never offered minority investors a premium. Hans Dieter Poetsch and Leif Oestling, VW’s chief financial officer and head of its commercial vehicles unit respectively, have held a series of talks in Sweden to convince investors of the merits of VW’s offer. Its bid has raised concerns among trade unionists and investors worried about future employment in Sweden, so the two VW officials have emphasized the group has no plans to cut jobs, plants or move Scania’s headquarters. Mr. Poetsch has said he was able to clear up any concerns that arose. Conscious that Scania is a fiercely proud truckmaker, VW reminded investors that it has 12 brands stretching from Bugatti to Skoda, each of which it affords a considerable amount of independence. VW needs 90 per cent of the share capital to achieve a squeeze out. Mr. Poetsch said last week that VW is convinced the offer represents “the maximum value which Scania shareholders can realistically achieve”. He said he was confident of achieving the 90 per cent threshold but said VW would not buy shares if that level could not be reached. He said that even under Scania's present structure the company had a "positive perspective" within the VW Group. However, VW believes that to tap the full amount of synergies between Scania and MAN it needs to be free of legal constraints at the Swedish truckmaker that stop it from exerting full control.

When Zenon C.R. Hansen returned to Allentown in 1985, it caused quite a stir. He was bigger than life, and deservingly so. Though Mack already had deep roots in Allentown, Zenon made it known to the world that Allentown was the “The Truck Capital of the World”. Hansen Returns To Allentown to Boost Bonds Drive December 12, 1985 / by DAN SHOPE, The Morning Call Though snow nearly canceled his flight from Dayton, Ohio, Zenon C.R. Hansen arrived undaunted yesterday at the 1986 U.S. Savings Bond kickoff reception in the Hamilton Plaza Hotel in Allentown. Unsurprised were those who knew the former chairman of the board and CEO of Mack Trucks Inc., who retired 11 years ago at age 65. After all, Hansen once hopscotched across America while rescuing Mack from a crisis in the mid-1960s. With the outgoing campaign chairman, former Mack President and CEO Alfred Pelletier, having his plane grounded by snow in Toronto, eyes turned to Hansen. Having retired in Florida, Hansen hadn't been seen in Lehigh Valley business circles for a decade. "They used to have an old expression when I was young - 'Save your money,' Hansen said. "Well, that kind of went by boards to some degree. But I have to say that in retirement, I found it a pretty good slogan. The only thing that I regret is that I didn't start early enough. One of the ways to do this is to accumulate U.S. Savings Bonds." Hansen spoke at the reception, at which Treasury Department area manager Bob Daday announced that the northeastern Pennsylvania region had sold $73,856,553 in bonds, easily surpassing the goal of $48,000,000. But most curiosity surrounded Hansen's involvement with Mack, not U.S. Savings Bonds. He was asked, flatly, if he was brought to Allentown as an adviser for Mack management. "As a matter of fact, I'm back here for the American Truck Foundation directors meeting which will make the allocations of their contributions for the year," Hansen said. "It's founded here in Allentown, and they contribute to Lehigh Valley charities and the American Truck Hall of Fame and the Truck Historical Society." But Hansen wasn't afraid to openly discuss Mack's recent problems. "All you have to do is read the daily business items, and you will find out that some businesses that existed 10-11 years ago have been absorbed," Hansen said. "Now, I don't think that's going to happen to Mack. What the ultimate outcome is of the problems, or questions, that they have to answer now. I can't tell you. "All I know is that I had a very fine relationship when I was in Allentown with Mack employees. They were absolutely super, and also with the Mack union (United Auto Workers). "From everything I have learned, the present management of Mack has that same relationship. But what the exact problems are, I can't say. I learned a long time ago that you don't talk about something you don't know something about. "I can't say what (Mack directors) are doing now," Hansen said. "I've been gone 11 years. I don't have the (recent) background with Mack. Now, maybe I'll have it before I leave, but I don't have it now. As far as I can see, they're doing a fine job. "But I have a very concrete background to compare with - the directors who were running the company before I came (in 1965). We dispensed with those directors and got others who knew something about trucks. Now, I'm not in a position to know how they work today."

He retained the position of chairman of the board until 1974, when he opted to follow company policy and retire at age 65.

Yes indeed, the last quote was yours. Thank you for supporting Mack's signature E9 V-8 product. There was never a thought (decision) to replace the 16.4-liter V-8 with the 11.93-liter E7. Each engine had its place. It was felt that the roughly 12-liter engine should have a power range from 350 to 480-500 horsepower (a power range which has become the norm for 12-13 liter engines globally) The delay in upgrading/equipping the E9 with Bosch high pressure unit pump injection for 1998-99 can be blamed on opposing camps. Fortunately the right one won. And, it was decided to relaunch the E9 as an EPA2004 compliant powertrain (rather than EPA98). Unfortunately, Volvo later killed the planned relaunch of the E9.

The second generation "RWI" Super-Liner (RW600) and MH Ultra-Liner share a common chassis which uses metric "body bound" bolts. There's a service bulletin that lays out the overall and shank lengths by size. We're accustomed to the English system, but the metric system is actually more versatile.

Truck News / March 15, 2014 Prime Transport Solutions (PTS) demonstrated at the Technology & Maintenance Council meetings, a pneumatic landing gear system that reduces the risk of driver injury and streamlines the coupling/uncoupling process. The PTS50 pneumatic landing gear, already used in Europe and also incorporated into Daimler’s SuperTruck project, allows the driver to raise or lower the landing gear with the push of a button. What takes on average four minutes using traditional landing gear can be done in five seconds with the PTS50, according to Simon Bois, executive vice-president and general manager, North America, for Prime Transport Solutions. Eliminating the crank handle also reduces weight by up to 40 lbs, and the screw and nut mechanisms that are the weakest components in a cranked leg are also done away with. The system has been piloted by four North American fleets with favorable results, Bois said. In addition to reducing the risk of injuries, Bois said the PTS50 also provides a recruiting edge for carriers, especially those looking to attract aging or female drivers. The system is designed to last the life of the trailer and in the event of a hang-up, there’s an easy-to-use manual override option, Bois added. The system consists of fewer parts, which can be easily replaced if repairs are required. “With the standard technology, more often than not if a leg is failing, you have to wait for your mobile technician to come,” he said. “With this technology, you can use manual override to simply raise or lower the legs within a couple of minutes.” The system will only work when the trailer is coupled to a tractor with air lines connected, Bois noted. It draws its air supply from the trailer’s air system. The PTS50 also provides fuel savings by reducing the time spent idling while coupling and decoupling. Bois said engine idle time is reduced by 97% during these activities. And he also noted carriers can pack more trailers into a yard, since they don’t need to leave as much space between units. The PTS50 brings a consistent height to the trailer fleet, but Bois admitted that if the trailer legs sink into the ground and the tractor cannot slide underneath it by dumping its air suspension, that the trailer may have to be jacked up on occasion. Still, he said that’ll rarely be necessary. “We’re trying to bring the trailer height to a consistent level,” he said. “There will be instances where it’ll sink in and under severe circumstances you’ll have to jack it up. We recognize that, but only rarely. Most of the time you’ll be able to lower the tractor suspension enough to raise the trailer as you need.” The company is now finalizing its plans to bring the system to market. It’s exploring both distributor and OE distribution channels. It is also working on finalizing pricing, though single unit pricing is likely to be around US$1,200 per system. While pneumatic landing gear has been explored in the past, Bois said previous systems were much more complex than the PTS50 design. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NyLjpKGI_jk http://www.primetransportsolutions.com

Why did Australia still get the E9 after US sales ended in 1998 for a time? Because Australia did not begin requiring Euro-3 (Australia emissions spec ADR80/00) or EPA98 engines in imported trucks until 2002. U.S. market 1998 E9 sales were 1997 production year engines because the E9 (with the mechanical pump) couldn’t meet 1998 emissions standards. Below are some outstanding comments on the subject that I have set aside: Once again, I took my E9 at 87,000lbs gross up I-81 to I-84 from PA to Boston MA and averaged 6.7mpg. Life is good with a V-8. I've been approached by more people in the last year than I ever have wanting to buy my Superliner E9. I just tell them no because there is nothing out there today that will replace it or even come close to it. Their next question is where can they get one. I just wish they had showed interest in E9's when they were in production, maybe we could still get one today. The funny thing is most of these guys are driving Ca- powered Pete's and KW's. I had a time trying to explain to a friend he was wasting his time trying to outpull my E9 on hills. He bought a new Pete with a 475 high torque CAT- that didn’t work. Then he took it to 550 - that didn’t work. Then he bought a 625 ecm for it and I sold the truck but I doubt it would have done it either. First off, the MP10 isn't cheap to produce because it's a niche product that can share few parts with the more common Volvo 11 and 13 liter engines. A V8 has the cost advantage that the cylinder dimensions will be similar to a smaller 6 and can share many parts and thus be built at lower costs. Second, Volvo's argument that the V8 didn't sell in sufficient volumes is bull- If Volvo had offered the V8 worldwide like Renault did the volumes would have been adequate, especially in markets like Scandinavia where 52 and 60 ton GCW limits are common. What Volvo doesn't comprehend is the emotional draw of the V-8... Sort of like how the distinctive sound and feel of Harley's V-Twin alone sells a lot of bikes. I was in South Dakota yesterday and saw over a dozen 13 axle double trailer "road trains" and even a 17 axle one. But not a single one was pulled by a Mack, they we're all hooked to Paccar products. One of the most memorable SD "road trains" in my experience was pulled by a V-8 powered Superliner... I could identify it's unmistakable roar before it came into sight! If Volvo had allowed Mack to revive the V8 in a new Superliner chassis, Mack would be the best selling truck in the high GVW states of the west and Canada. On my ride in South Dakota yesterday I saw at least a dozen 13 axle grain trains and the 17 axle side dump train I posted over at www.gearheadgrrrl.com. SD has no maximum weight limit or overall length limit, just Formula "B" and the trailers and dolly in a doubles train are limited to 81-1/2 feet in length. Thus those 13 axle trains can run at around 150k GCW and the 17 axle train about 170k! So these trucks are running at twice the STAA weight limits of 80k GCW, and it's not rocket science that they need twice the horsepower and torque. Even the MP16 at SD maximum weights is going to be the equivalent of a 300 HP torqueless wonder 8 liter "midrange" engine. An MP8 isn't gonna cut it at these weights, and the Mack V8 was just gettin' warmed up at the 500 HP rating with 700 HP and higher ratings waiting in the wings. Then factor in the easier packaging of the V8..... For Canada and a lot of permit haulers the Titan is about a foot too long. Imagine if the V8 Mack was still on the market, drawing in buyers with its efficiency and power, and hooking 'em with it's lusty lyrics! I think the last CL with an E9 is in Hagerstown at the powertrain plant. It is equipped with V-MAC technology and everything about it is computer controlled. Many people have tried to buy it but as far as I know it's still there. I have been told that the E9 was going to make a come back in 2003, it was beating the six bangers in fuel economy on the test stands and conforming to all the EPA standards but the Volvo purchase took place in 2002 and the E9 program was canned to make way for the MP-10/D-16 engine. I have 2 E9's running right now. One in a 1987 Superliner with a E9-400 that's never been pumped up, and the other in a 1990 Superliner with an E9-500 that's pushing 600-650 hp. Every truck driver I have ever talked to has a V8 Mack story. They either tell you about one they drove and how well they liked it or how one blew their doors off. If you ever drove one that was right you don't want anything else. I am currently doing an in-frame overhaul on mine which is the 1990 Superliner. Parts are getting very expensive but no more than any other comparable engine. I'm going to have between 6k and 7k in this overhaul not counting labor. My friend with a C15 550 CAT just spent more than that overhauling his engine. I have 2 spare E9 engines and I think while parts are still available I'm going to start building another one for the next go round cause I don't want nothing else. Most people that I have talked to really like that E9 V8 engine. In talking with the folks at the Mack museum, some of the development stuff is still proprietary but I met someone from the Mack plant at the Macungie show last week and he will try to put me in touch the some folks in Hagerstown. Apparently, they still hand-build a few E9's per week for export only. Once I have some names, I'll make a trip down there and see what materials that might be available for public consumption. My Dad and I both had a couple of E9's I swear by them. Once you have one it's hard to go back to anything else. The only major things we ever had was on the 94 CL E9 500 had some bad injector o-rings and she filled the crankcase right up with fuel when it was almost new. the 90 Superliner E9 400 my Dad blew a coolant hose off on a and got it a little too hot and it dropped a valve seat and cost him a head, piston and liner about 5or 6 months later. and the 92 MH E9 450 I had had a couple of pitted liners and put coolant in the oil, I did an in-frame on it and still have the engine now in my 89 Superliner. I'd just like to add my bit about the mighty V8 Mack engine. While I will agree to some of the comments made about EPA regulations, the point is that it could have been achieved. But I don't think Volvo wanted to at the end of the day. The new MP10 is just a Volvo engine. It is NOT a Mack engine. You can paint it red, call it MP10, say that it is a monster of an engine, but it still a Volvo engine. Here in Australia, the so-called “new breed” Mack are just rebadged Volvos. I believe that this Volvo's way of destroying the brand just so they can use the Mack name to push there product. If I wanted a Volvo, I would have bought one. I DON'T LIKE THEIR TRUCKS, and I couldn't care how good they are. If the v8 was to continue to be produced, then people would still buy the V8. Like the guy before said, Scania, Benz and MAN can do it then, so could have Mack. They are just making excuses to justify their decision not to. I think the thing that pisses everyone off about Volvo is the fact that Volvo keeps replacing Mack parts with Volvo parts. Now on the other hand if you look at a company like Daimler who owns Freightliner and western star they have taken the Detroit diesel engine designed and built here in the USA and are using it in their own trucks in the USA as well as Germany . In my opinion Mack truck would have been a better company today if it was part of the Freightliner western star group they probably would still be using their own engine design as well as many other of their own designs from yesteryear. I was at a meeting with Detroit Diesel just before the DD13 thru 16 came to market and was told by the German representative that the motors were a joint venture including not only Detroit America engineers but mechanics as well from both countries. So I think that American engineering is to be respected as well. Now this is where Volvo need's to come down from there high horse and start to respect the American consumer. WE DON'T LIKE BEING PIS…ED ON AND TOLD THAT IT'S RAINING!!! Volvo never built a drivetrain like Mack and never will. But they are going to try and that will be the downfall of the “Greatest Name in Trucks”! They keep pushing aside American engineering an technology, and think their engineers are the greatest thing since ice cream. I talked with a man in KY who had 12 in RW's and CL's. The newest was a 95 and he had already retired 8 more current trucks. All had over 500,000 miles hauling coal 120,000lbs at a time. He adjusted the valves and retorqued the head bolts every year, did rod and main bearings at 500,000 and had only had two go down. He told me one that went down only had 45,000 miles on it and Mack rebuilt it under warranty and it was still running. The other had a valve seat come out of a head around 650,000. I talked to him for hours just listening to someone that seemed to know what he was talking about. In his opinion, it was a great engine and when his trucks were finally wore out he was getting out of the business. He had tried an ETECH 460XT, Cummins N-14 525 and Cat 3406E 550, and none of them pulled the hills and lasted like the Mack E9. He told me to replace my rod and main bearings every 500k and to run the overhead and torque the head bolts once a year. And if I ever had a head off, he said to replace all the head gaskets and bolts and start with the once a year thing again and I wouldn’t have any issues. I’ve noticed driving my last E9 truck that they don’t need to be revved more than about 1600 to do anything. If you run em higher, you just burn more fuel. Just let the engine do the work (not your foot) and take care of it and you will be fine. Ours ran 30,000 hours. It started to seep coolant into the oil and we tore it down and did a complete overhaul. All that was wrong was one liner had some pitting . We have all 8 pistons and 7 liners for spares just in case. E9s are awesome engines.

My friend, thank you for having a sense of humor. As far as you and your trucks, I couldn’t possibly argue with a gentleman who is completely satisfied with his Volvo (rebadged as Mack MP) engines. I’ve posted several times that Volvo today makes an acceptable truck and engine (while not in the same league as Scania, MAN or Mercedes-Benz). I have nothing against Volvo. I simply don't want this Swedish truckmaker owning America's most iconic truckmaker, Mack Trucks, and joining Daimler in dominating our country’s truck industry. I do NOT feel that the acquisition of Mack Trucks by a foreign truckmaker was good for the United States of America. I do NOT feel the dominance of America's truck industry by foreign truckmakers is in the best interest of the United States of America. Now, let’s talk about the heavy haul market and engines availability. Initially, we felt the new-for-1999 12-liter E7-460 E-Tech (high pressure unit pump injection), offering an impressive power to weight ratio, could take over for the V-8. With 460 horsepower in front of the right tranny and axles, there’s a solid argument that this was adequate power for a majority of operators in heavy haulage. And if customers wanted still more power, that same year Mack Trucks also launched the E7-460XT. Rated at 490 horsepower and 1,760 lb/ft of torque, it was available in pedigreed CL’s for heavy haulage, and CH’s for the owner-operator. And of course, it was backed by a 3-year/300,000 mile Bulldog warranty (100% parts and labor coverage). Volvo’s warranty today for EPA2010 engines is only 2-years/250,000 miles. Evidently, Volvo isn’t as confident about their Mack-branded Volvo engines as the former Mack Trucks was with their pedigreed powerplants. As one operator put it, “I have a 2000 Mack CL 713 and it has a 460XT engine (487 HP @ 1800)(1760 lb/ft @ 1700). This engine is in front of a 13 speed transmission and runs like a scalded dog. I can actually outrun cars from a stop when empty. It pulls loads up the KY cut in the hill at 55-60 grossing 80,000 lbs. None of my other engines runs like this one, including CAT and Detroit.” Despite having E7s rated up to 490 horsepower, Mack distributors were passing on customer demands to Sales Marketing in Allentown for the return of the Mack V-8. Customers knew it was good for 500 to 700+ horsepower and wanted that power. The subject went back and forth in Sales Marketing, and the decision was later made to add Bosch high pressure unit pump injection (E-Tech) and cooled EGR. Scania did the same through Euro-5 (near EPA2007), on their version, running Bosch high pressure unit pump injection which they called Scania PDE (Pumpe-Düse-Einspritzung). Like the related Scania DC16, the Mack E9 V-8 could be with us today in EPA2010 (Euro-6) form if Volvo hadn’t terminated that plan, so as to make way for their own D16. So did Mack actually lose the heavy haul market despite having the near 500 horsepower E7-460XT? That’s arguable. Certainly Mack lost the 500 to 600 horsepower customers. However, if Mack’s legendary high horsepower V-8 had made a quick return just a few years later in 2003-2004, the company would have been firmly positioned back in that market segment in the United States, as well as Australia and other global markets. You said that “Volvo must have some respect for the Mack name”. My friend, Volvo only respects the Mack name for its brand value. And with each passing day that Volvo is putting the Mack name on a Volvo platform, that brand value is shrinking. Mack is now just another truck on the road, no longer anything special (in fact it’s basically identical to another truck on the road – Volvo). Volvo is merely using the Mack name on their North American market Volvo chassis (VN and VHD Series) to both make money and grow market share for Volvo Group in the US market as part of their global battle with Daimler. It all goes back to Volvo’s goal of being the largest truckmaker in the world by volume. The Mack brand is a pawn in helping Volvo to reach their goal. Renault respected Mack and supported continuance of the company as an independent truck manufacturer (the two companies cooperated where viable synergies could be identified, e.g. E7 and E9 powerplants in Renault trucks). Volvo on the other hand essentially closed Mack Trucks and began putting legacy Mack cabs on Volvo VN and VHD chassis. When the Mack name has out served its usefulness, it will join White, Autocar and GMC. For Volvo, the Mack brand is merely a means to an end. All their passion is for Volvo. Mack had three engines in 2000 when Volvo acquired the company. But Volvo all along planned to change Mack entirely, integrating the brand onto its Volvo global components platform that included the D11, D13 and upcoming D16. And they did.

My friend, I know for a fact that Hagerstown was building E9 V-8s thru 2003. And so does Volvo. Please note page 17 (http://www.marketingstrategiesandsolutions.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Volvo-Hagerstown-50th.pdf) I hope you will now trust me when say that, after acquiring Mack on April 21, 2000, Volvo terminated E9 production in 2003. You say that it was never written that evolving the E9 to meet future emissions standards “couldn’t be done”. You’re half right. Volvo (and MackLegacy) would like you to believe it would have cost “a small fortune” to create an electronically fuel injected E9 so as to meet EPA1998 (near Euro-3), and they avoid discussing EPA2004 (near Euro-4). Of course, the truth is that with high pressure unit pump (or common rail) injection, the E9 could have, with the same evolving emissions technologies all global truck makers have been utilizing, gone all the way to EPA2007 and Euro-5. And with extra high pressure common rail injection that all truck makers have used since 2010 to further reduce emissions levels, the Mack E9 could easily meet EPA2010 paired with Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) and a light to heavy EGR rate of 18-20% to 28-30%. With their DC16 V-8, Scania rather clearly validates this point. Was the cost to evolve the E9 V-8 forward prohibitive? No, of course not. No more than developing the D16 was cost prohibitive for Volvo. In fact, as Scania has proven, a V-8 can share many components with your 12-13 liter engine, actually reducing costs by increasing economy-of-scale. A high output engine is a necessary product, and its development expense is the cost of doing business. Scania engineers chuckle when they hear Volvo's official company line excuse that the Mack E9 was terminated because it couldn’t meet future emissions and/or evolving the V-8 forward was cost prohibitive. Volvo simply wanted to use its upcoming Swedish D16 instead. When Volvo tries to paint a dim picture of low E9 production volumes as another reason for terminating this powerhouse, there are two important aspects to realize. First, like the V-8 is for Scania, the Mack E9 V-8 was a halo product as well as a high-performer. The brand value that a legendary halo product brings can not be measured by normal standards. And second, as the average Class 8 truck’s horsepower level has incrementally risen over the last 15-20 years, the percentage of high horsepower engines sold annually in heavy trucks has inherently swelled dramatically. Thus, like the Scania DC16 V-8, an EPA2010 Mack E9 would have a significantly wider customer base today. The fact of the matter is, it would have been cheaper for Volvo to evolve the Mack E9 into an emissions-compliant EPA2010 engine than to develop the D16 from scratch. But Volvo wanted to go their own way, as they always do. Volvo arrogantly prefers their own engineering (which is fine…..when the nameplate says Volvo), and planned from day one to terminate Mack-engineered trucks and move over to the Volvo global components platform. Hence Volvo’s closure of Mack World Headquarters and the Mack Trucks Engineering, Development and Test Center; and Hagerstown becoming a Volvo Powertrain facility. 2000 DC16 04 500hp Euro-3, intercooled, Scania PDE Unit Injection DC16 03 580hp Euro-3, Intercooled, Scania PDE Unit Injection 2004 DC16 06 500hp Euro-4, Intercooled, Scania PDE Unit Injection DC16 05 560hp Euro-4, Intercooled, Scania PDE Unit Injection DC16 08 620hp Euro-4, Intercooled, Scania PDE Unit Injection 2009 DC16 19 500hp Euro-5, Intercooled, Scania PDE Unit Injection DC16 18 560hp Euro-5, Intercooled, Scania PDE Unit Injection DC16 17 620hp Euro-5, Intercooled, Scania PDE Unit Injection DC16 21 730hp Euro-5, Intercooled, Scania PDE Unit Injection 2013 DC16 101 520hp Euro-6 (near EPA2010), Scania XPI* Common Rail Injection DC16 102 580hp Euro-6 (near EPA2010), Scania XPI* Common Rail Injection DC16 103 730hp Euro-6 (near EPA2010), Scania XPI* Common Rail Injection * Cummins-Scania XPI Manufacturing LLP, a 50/50 joint venture, designs, develops and manufactures next generation fuel systems. http://www.scania.com/products-services/buses-coaches/safety-technology/engine-technology/xpi/ http://www.cummins.com/cmi/navigationAction.do?nodeId=7&siteId=1&menuId=1001

Please allow me to explain, in further detail, how we came to arrive at this point today. I’m not for a moment going to tell you that the executives of America’s truckmakers were/are all angels (although Zenon C.R. Hansen was), but I will bluntly tell you the business culture today at most of Europe’s truckmakers is altogether different from the United States. The word ruthless doesn’t begin to describe it. Frankly, we Americans aren’t accustomed to the underhanded way they execute to get ahead, and it puts us at a business disadvantage. To Volvo and Daimler, they are engaged in a global battle. The American truck industry has never known such a business environment. And this has much to do with why European truckmakers now dominate America’s truck industry. In our great country that once led the world in industrial might and innovation, foreign truckmakers have now proven to be savvier in America’s truck industry than our own manufacturers. The sadness of this irony is, from the very beginning of trucking before World War I to the late 1990s, America’s truckmakers were always superior to their European peers. Mack was never asleep at the wheel, but we did miss in 1989. We had an 11 month distraction named Ralph Reins. Without any experience in the heavy truck industry, this short time Mack president left behind a real mess. He represented the new younger executive that changes companies every few years. As a result of Ralph Reins being chosen as Mack new president, a justifiably upset Joseph P. Rossetti resigned on November 14, 1989 from his position as executive vice president of marketing at Mack Trucks. He was a Mack veteran going back to 1964. While one might not have ticked all the boxes when considering Joe for the head position, he was a dedicated and dynamic career Mack man. Joe could certainly have done a better job as president than Ralph Reins and I wish he’d been given a chance. Note: Joe Rossetti went on to head Northeast Truck Group based in Rockaway, New Jersey. While I could accept the board’s thought process for looking “outside the box” for Mack’s next leader, as Ford more recently did when selecting ex-Boeing man Alan Mulally, Reins was no Mulally. Unknown to many Americans (but certainly no secret), Volvo's ability to acquire Mack Trucks has its roots in the failed merger between Renault and Volvo. Renault became extremely disgusted with their would-be partner Volvo and cancelled merger discussions, however Volvo was able to use that platform and acquire control of RVI (Renault Vehicles Industries) and hence Mack Trucks. Thus, Mack Trucks was a victim of a European struggle between Renault and Volvo. Mack Trucks itself committed no wrongdoing. It was entirely because Volvo wanted to buy up more US market share that the Swedes set their sights on Mack Trucks (having already acquired the market share of White, Autocar and GMC). Nobody at Mack was sleeping at their post. Volvo’s ability to acquire Mack Trucks has much to do the Swedish truckmaker turning a high level Mack executive into a Volvo spy, in return for a future position as CEO of Volvo Trucks North America, Volvo played dirty pool to get their hands on Mack Trucks from the beginning. Volvo met with Marc Gustafson, Mack’s vice president of sales and marketing from 1992, and paid him off to be a traitor for the Volvo cause. Gustafson plotted with the ruthless Swedes at Volvo to conspire against Mack Trucks, telling Volvo everything Mack was planning from 1992 onward. Gustafson abruptly left Mack in 1996 to become CEO of Volvo Trucks North America. Marc Gustafson betrayed Mack Trucks and shared his privileged insider company knowledge with competitor Volvo. The secrets that Gustafson passed on to Volvo were instrumental in allowing this foreign truckmaker to takeover America’s Mack Trucks. Mack won in court, but realistically the Gustafson damage was irreparable. And note the time period, 1992-1996. This is when Mack lost momentum and direction. Do you want to complain about Mack product offerings in the 1990s? Do you want to know why Mack didn’t launch a third generation U.S. market Super-Liner in 1996, same as the Australian market*? Then you should all ask the traitorous Marc Gustafson, Mack’s vice president of sales and marketing from 1992 thru 1996. That was his call. With the promise of becoming the president of Volvo Trucks North America once having served his purpose as a spy at Mack Trucks, Gustafson took marching orders from Volvo and set Mack up to fail. * The Macungie-produced RWI600/700 Superliner II, utilizing the advanced Ultra-Liner chassis, was built from 1984 thru 1993. However the legendary Super-Liner’s story didn’t end there for those “down under’. Mack Trucks Australia introduced the third generation Super-Liner in 1996 and it’s been a hot seller ever since. Ironically, after just four years as CEO of Volvo Trucks of North America, Volvo Group fired Gustafson (traitors get what they deserve in the end). He then headed Freightliner subsidiary American LaFrance for just one year. If he’d been a man of integrity rather than a self-serving traitor, the United States might still have Mack Trucks today. Renault-appointed Mack President Pierre Jocou responded quickly and took a hard stand against Gustafson’s defection*. But Volvo then used its relationship with Renault (the result of their merger negotiations) to ease the legal battle against Gustafson. Volvo succeeded in replacing the pro-Mack President Pierre Jocou with the pro-Volvo takeover Mack President Michel Gigou. This is why Pierre Jocou's tenure as Mack president, which began in March 1995, ended suddenly in November 1996. From December 1996 thru July 2001, Jocou's replacement Michel Gigou was just floating along while the Volvo takeover of “the greatest name in trucks” was being finalized. Renault’s Gigou was the other traitor orchestrating Mack’s fall into Volvo’s hands, taking marching orders from Volvo in return for a high position at the Swedish truckmaker. Gigou was generously rewarded, becoming president and CEO of Volvo Trucks North America from 2000, and senior VP of Volvo Group from 2004. Mack Presidents Tenure John M. Mack 1900 to 1905 / 1909 to October 17, 1911 Otto Mears April 29, 1905 to January 9, 1906 Jacob Sulzbach January 9, 1906 to January 8, 1907 Thomas Rush January 8, 1907 to December 8, 1908 Charles P. Coleman October 17, 1911 to June 13, 1913 John Calder June to October 1913 Vernon Munroe October 22, 1913 to May 23, 1917 Alfred J. Brosseau May 15, 1917 to September 24, 1936 Emil C. Fink January 28, 1937 to January 1, 1943 Charles T. Ruhf August 5, 1943 to June 6, 1949 Edwin D. Bransome June 6, 1949 to January 11, 1955 Peter O. Peterson January 11, 1955 to December 31, 1958 Christian A. Johnson 1958 to 1962 (acting President) Nicholas Dykstra July 20, 1961 to September 1, 1962 C. Rhoades McBride September 7, 1962 to January 6, 1965 Zenon C.R. Hansen January 7, 1965 to January 28, 1972 Henry J. Nave January 28, 1972 to January 1, 1976 Alfred W. Pelletier January 1, 1976 to July 21, 1980 John B. Curcio July 21, 1980 to October 23, 1989 Ralph Reins November 23, 1989 to October 11, 1990 Elios Pascual October 18, 1990 to March 1, 1995 Pierre Jocou March 1, 1995 to November 29, 1996 Michel Gigou December 1, 1996 to July 1, 2001 Paul Vikner July 1, 2001 to April 1, 2008 Dennis Slagle April 1, 2008 to January 1, 2012 Kevin Flaherty January 1, 2012 to September 5, 2013 Stephen Roy Present * Mack Trucks Sues Former Executive, Says Marc Gustafson Took Company Secrets With Him To His New Job October 01, 1996 | by ELLIOT GROSSMAN, The Morning Call Mack Trucks Inc. has sued the new president of rival truck manufacturer, Volvo GM Heavy Truck Corp., accusing him of taking company secrets when he left Mack two weeks ago. And Mack has won at least a partial victory in Round 1 of the legal battle involving Marc Gustafson, a former Mack executive vice president. Chief Judge Edward Cahn of the U.S. District Court in Allentown issued a temporary restraining order Friday, forbidding Gustafson from participating in any Volvo sales and marketing activities or from disclosing any Mack sales and marketing information at Volvo. But Mack wanted Gustafson blocked from working for Volvo -- or any Mack competitors -- for at least a year. Mack also asked for damages to be awarded at a trial. At a hearing next Tuesday, Cahn will more deeply delve into the case so he can issue a permanent order. Gustafson served as Mack's executive vice president for sales and marketing for four years until he resigned Sept. 19, effective that day. He then went to work at Volvo GM Heavy Truck headquarters in Greensboro, N.C. Mack sued him last week in Lehigh County Court. But he asked that the case be heard in federal court, and Mack did not object. Mack claims that Gustafson is violating his contract with Mack. In the contract, according to Mack, Gustafson promised to not disclose any confidential Mack information outside Mack. "It would be impossible for him to ignore his knowledge of Mack's business plans as he considers Volvo's business plans and its competitive strategies," according to Mack's lawsuit. For example, the suit claims, Gustafson has knowledge of Mack secrets about its costs and pricing structures. This information, which Mack uses when bidding on large orders of trucks, is known only to select individuals at Mack. Since Mack and Volvo often compete for such orders, Volvo will have an unfair advantage, according to Mack. Also, Gustafson's knowledge about products being developed by Mack will enable Volvo to take steps to respond to Mack's new products before the products are announced publicly, Mack claims. Before filing the suit, Mack President Pierre Jocou sent a letter to Volvo's chairman, asking him to not employ Gustafson, at least until the two sides resolve Mack's concerns.

I have no problem with Dave McKenna. He's an old Mack guy trying to mouth the Volvo party line and hang in there until retirement. He's at that age where job changing isn't an attractive option. But Dave made his opinion about Volvo's termination of the Mack V-8 relaunch crystal clear when he said "I didn't like the decision then and frankly still don't like it now." My friend, that pretty much says it all. I note that you often don't have your facts right. Two examples, the first of course is the fact that emissions did not kill the Mack E9 V-8, Rather it was Volvo terminating the project to upgrade the E9 to meet the new emissions. And you think Volvo acquired Mack in 2001 when it was 2000. You should recall that down in Greensboro. MackLegacy: "You guys hit on the right answer related to emissions killing the E9. Volvo didn't have anything to do with the decision as it was made in 1998ish and Volvo did not buy Mack/Renault until 2001. One important reason was left out and that is the volume of V8s produced. Could the E9 have been made compliant? Of course, anything can be done given time and money. The unfortunate part is that the astronomical costs to do so would never have been offset by the number of E9s that were sold" The emissions and production volume statement was/is Volvo's official company line excuse (because Volvo wanted to use its upcoming Swedish D16 instead). Sure, Volvo doesn't know how to execute like Scania. But even under Volvo, Mack "legacy" engineers could have put the new E9 into production and it would be selling today like the Euro-6 (EPA2010) Scania DC16 V-8. Or are you and Volvo admitting that Scania is a more efficient and capable organization?

My friend, it's good to catch up with you again. If I may, I have two yes or no questions I'd like to run by you. Do you feel that the acquisition of Mack Trucks by a foreign truckmaker was good for America? Do you feel the dominance of America's truck industry by foreign truckmakers is in the best interest of the United States?

No, I'm not talking about 30 years ago. After Volvo bought Mack in 2000, they killed the 10 liter and three years later killed the E9. Thus, it was Volvo's actions that resulted in Mack being whittled down to just one engine.

"People complain about the Mack mp engine being Volvo" Well, I think you hit the nail on the head. In the United States market, most Americans can't imagine a Mack truck having a Volvo engine, chassis, transmission and so forth. However Americans could if the nameplate said Volvo (call a spade a spade). If you want to call it a Mack, then build a Mack. If I'd wanted a Volvo, I would have shopped for a Volvo. Let's talk about engine size. In recent decades, Mack had three engine sizes. We had a baby eight 7.8 liter (ETZ477/E4-210), a power segment later upgraded to 9.83 liters (EM5-250/290)) to keep up with the times, the 12 liter E7 (11.93L) and the 16.4 liter V-8. 10, 12 and 16 liters, well, I would call that a well-rounded engine portfolio even in year 2014. In both the U.S. and global markets, in both emerging and developed countries, the most popular engine size is 350-420hp in in the 11-13 liter range. And the E7 displacement wise was right there in the middle, offering a superb balance of power, fuel economy, weight and price. And of course, the legendary Mack V-8, a true halo product, was an engine that none of Mack's competitors could touch. Mack had an entire market segment all to themselves.

The Scania V-8 screensaver, and V-8 ringtone for your mobile phone. http://www3.scania.com/en/V8/GB/Download/